



Free *qat* handouts secure a high voter turnout in Yemen's elections

For Imam Yahya, one of Yemen's last kings, *qat* was a delight that he praised in poems. For his adversary, the revolutionary al-Zubayri, the plant was the "devil in the shape of a tree".

Still today the views on *qat* greatly diverge. For some, *qat* farming is the *perpetuum mobile* of Yemen's rural economy and *qat* chewing an age-old social pursuit that has helped to preserve Yemeni identity in a rapidly changing world. For others, *qat* is the main inhibitor of human and economic development in Yemen and is to blame for poverty and corruption, the depletion of Yemen's water resources and the country's sloppy approach to fighting Islamist terror.

While some believe that *qat* chewing was the very motor of Yemen's "Arab Spring", others hold it responsible for Yemen's muddled revolution with its high blood toll. In internet blogs even *al-Qaeda*, its affiliates, and sympathizers discuss the pros and cons of the drug, and a number of Yemeni suicide bombers have met their fate with *qat*-filled cheeks. A final decision of *al-Qaeda* on what stance to adopt towards the drug has seemingly been postponed. The Jihadists want to avoid alienating Yemen's population with a premature ban of the popular stimulant before having gained firm control over the country. *Al-Qaeda* has learned from the mistakes of its Islamist sister organization, the al-Shabab militia in war-torn Somalia.

With Yemen's 2011 "Youth Revolution", a decade of half-hearted *qat* policies and missed opportunities has come to an end – a decade, however, that has succeeded in lifting the veil of silence that was cast over *qat* in media and politics after President Ali Abdullah Salih came to power in 1978. This whitewash had been part of a ruling bargain between the Salih regime and the unruly tribes that had imparted highland Yemen several decades of relative stability and Salih a 33-year rule.

With the forecast depletion of Yemen's oil and gas reserves within the next decade, the economic importance of *qat* will further increase and will bring about an important shift in the balance of power from the central government towards the *qat* producing highland tribes. The challenge of addressing the *qat* problem is thus tremendous for Yemen's policy makers. While the transitional government is hesitant about its future *qat* course and anxious not to open a "war" on yet another front, Yemen's anti-*qat* activists have seized the current, favorable climate of change. Emboldened by Yemen's revolution and the ouster of President Salih they have recently launched a series of campaigns against the drug, dubbed a "revolution on one's self".

Politics of Qat

The Role of a Drug in Ruling Yemen

Peer Gatter



Jemen-Studien Band 20.1 · Peer Gatter · Politics of Qat



Reichert

JEMEN-STUDIEN

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON HORST KOPP

Band 20.1

Peer Gatter

Politics of Qat

The Role of a Drug in Ruling Yemen

2012

DR. LUDWIG REICHERT VERLAG · WIESBADEN

Cover illustrations:

Front cover: A *qāt* merchant in the highland village
of al-Jabīn in Rayma governorate.

Back cover: Free *qāt* handouts secured a high voter turnout
in Yemen's first direct presidential elections in 1999.

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie;
detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

Gedruckt auf säurefreiem Papier
(alterungsbeständig – pH7, neutral)

© 2012 Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag Wiesbaden
www.reichert-verlag.de
ISBN: 978-3-89500-910-5

Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt.
Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes
ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar.
Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen
und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.
Printed in Germany

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Editor's Preface</i>	page ix
<i>List of Tables</i>	xvi
<i>List of Figures</i>	xviii
<i>List of Maps</i>	xix
<i>List of Annexes</i>	xx
<i>Abbreviations and Acronyms</i>	xxii
<i>Photo Credits</i>	xxiv
 <i>Introductory Section</i>	 xxv
<i>Prologue</i>	xxvii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xxxii
<i>The State of Research and the Sources of this Book</i>	xxxvii
I. Curse or Blessing – A Background on <i>Qāt</i> and its Consumption	1
A. The <i>Qāt</i> Plant and its Origins	1
B. The History of <i>Qāt</i> Use	3
C. Factors Promoting the Recent Spread of <i>Qāt</i> Cultivation and Use	9
D. The Role of <i>Qāt</i> in Contemporary Yemen	14
E. <i>Qāt</i> Consumption Statistics	17
F. <i>Qāt</i> and the Rural Economy	22
G. The Health Impact of <i>Qāt</i>	32
<i>Notes for Chapter I</i>	38
II. From Agrarian State to Oil Rentier	43
A. Labor Migration, the Remittance Economy, and Changes in Agriculture	44
B. The Oil Economy	47
The End of the Oil Age	52
A Future in Gas?	54
C. Rentier States in Times of Revenue Crisis	54
<i>Notes for Chapter II</i>	56
III. <i>Qāt</i> Politics in a Regional Retrospect	59
A. <i>Qāt</i> in Colonial East Africa – A Hopeless Battle	59
British Somaliland	61
Colonial Kenya	63
French Somaliland (Djibouti)	65
Italian Somaliland	70
B. <i>Qāt</i> Policy in Colonial Aden	73
The British <i>Qāt</i> Ban of 1957/58	85
<i>Qāt</i> and the Resistance to British Rule	92
The End of Ethiopian <i>Qāt</i> Imports	95

C.	<i>Qāt</i> During the Reign of Yemen’s Imāms	101
D.	The League of Arab States Incriminates <i>Qāt</i>	114
E.	<i>Qāt</i> Politics in Saudi Arabia	116
	Religious Rulings and Legislation on <i>Qāt</i>	116
	The Jabl Fayfā’ Development Program	119
	A Bitter Reality	120
	Prevalence of <i>Qāt</i> Chewing in Jāzān Province	123
	The Jāzān Development Plan	125
	<i>Qāt</i> -Related Sensitivities	129
	<i>Qāt</i> Policy as Instrument of Wahhābī Hegemony and Saudi Geopolitics	129
	Saudi Arabia’s Regional <i>Qāt</i> Politics	134
F.	Post-Colonial Somalia and the Curse of <i>Qāt</i>	135
	The <i>Qāt</i> Factor in Ogaden’s Inclusion into Ethiopia	135
	The Years of Military Dictatorship	135
	Civil War and the Operation “Restore Hope”	142
	Kenyan Flight and Trade Embargos	143
	The Movement of Islamic Courts Bans <i>Qāt</i>	144
	Al-Shabāb Intensifies the Struggle Against <i>Qāt</i>	146
	<i>Notes for Chapter III</i>	152
IV.	Revolutionary Yemen and the Issue of <i>Qāt</i>	163
A.	<i>Qāt</i> and the Socialist Innovators of South Yemen	163
B.	Politics of <i>Qāt</i> in Republican North Yemen During the 1960s and 1970s	169
	Prime Minister al-‘Aynī’s ‘Suicidal’ Anti- <i>Qāt</i> Campaign	173
	Motives of the 1972 Anti- <i>Qāt</i> Agenda	178
	<i>Qāt</i> in Early Agricultural Policies and Government Planning	184
	Al-Ḥamdī Brings <i>Qāt</i> Back into the Focus of Politics	185
	Northern <i>Qāt</i> Politics Inspired by the PDRY	189
	Al-Ghashmī: Buying Loyalty With <i>Qāt</i>	190
	<i>Notes for Chapter IV</i>	192
V.	Changes in <i>Qāt</i> Politics following President Ṣāliḥ’s Ascent to Power	197
A.	<i>Qāt</i> and the Ruling Bargain Between Tribes and State	199
	Eliminating <i>Qāt</i> from National Statistics and Donor Reports	203
	Promoting <i>Qāt</i> Consumption	206
	Reforming the <i>Qāt</i> Tax to the Benefit of the Highland Tribes	209
B.	‘Organizing’ the <i>Qāt</i> Trade	221
	Introducing Permits for <i>Qāt</i> Sellers	221
	Moving Markets Out of the Cities	223
C.	Incentives for <i>Qāt</i> Production	223
	Subsidies in the Water Sector Encourage <i>Qāt</i> Farming	223
	Improving the Road Network	225
	The Plant Quarantine Law	226
	The <i>Qāt</i> , Fruit and Vegetable Import Ban	227

D. Excluding <i>Qāt</i> from Agricultural Research, Services and Credits	228
E. Rejection of Foreign Involvement Regarding <i>Qāt</i>	230
F. Yemen's Unification and <i>Qāt</i>	232
G. <i>Nizām al-Qāt</i>	234
The Blanket of Silence	234
<i>Qāt</i> -Induced Conflicts Over Water and Land	235
Notes for Chapter V	238
VI. The Rediscovery of <i>Qāt</i> as an Instrument of Rent-Seeking	243
A. Cautiously Bowing to Donor Demands Regarding <i>Qāt</i>	243
The Hesitant Inclusion of <i>Qāt</i> in Official Statistics	244
The Birth of an Inoperative Unit for <i>Qāt</i> Research	255
Enforcing a Higher Taxation of <i>Qāt</i>	259
<i>Qāt</i> in Policy Planning Following the Structural Adjustment Programme	260
B. The 1998/99 Revenue Crisis and President Ṣāliḥ's Anti- <i>Qāt</i> Initiative	265
Sports and Computing vs. <i>Qāt</i> Chewing	265
Banning <i>Qāt</i> Use Among Security Forces and in Government Facilities	270
Extending Official Working Hours	271
Taking Action Against <i>Qāt</i> Sellers	273
Controlling the Discourse on <i>Qāt</i> by a National Conference	273
Introducing <i>Qāt</i> in Political Planning	275
Why Lifting the <i>Qāt</i> Taboo?	280
Threats to Political Stability and to the Regime's Resource Base in the Late 1990s	282
<i>Qāt</i> Politics as Crisis Management	290
What Became of <i>Qāt</i> Policies Once the Economic Crisis Had Been Overcome?	293
C. The Long Awaited Conference on <i>Qāt</i>	295
Growing Political Resistance to a Conference on <i>Qāt</i>	295
The Conference Takes Place Against all Odds	297
The President and the Conference	301
Views of <i>Qāt</i> Advocates and Opponents	302
Recommendations of the Conference	304
The Echo in the Press and on the Streets	305
Conference Follow-up	309
Why Hold the <i>Qāt</i> Conference after the Revenue Crisis had been Overcome?	311
Notes for Chapter VI	314
VII. Ups and Downs in <i>Qāt</i> Politics After 2002	323
A. Period of Stagnation in <i>Qāt</i> Politics	323
<i>Qāt</i> in Political Planning in the 2000s	324
B. The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Revival of the <i>Qāt</i> Debate	328
A New Anti-Corruption Agenda	329
Moving on Weapons Markets and Bearing Arms	330
The Revival of <i>Qāt</i> Activism in Government Since 2006	334
Political Will for Change?	353

C.	Debates With Yemeni Policy Makers on <i>Qāt</i>	356
	‘Abd al-Karīm al- Iryānī, Political Advisor to President Ṣāliḥ	356
	‘Abd al-‘Azīz ‘Abd al-Ghanī, President of the Consultative Council	357
	‘Abd al-Karīm al-Arḥabī, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs	357
	Rashād Muḥammad al-‘Alīmī, Deputy Prime Minister for Defense & Security	358
	‘Abd al-Raḥmān Faḍl al-Iryānī, Minister of Water & Environment	358
	<i>Notes for Chapter VII</i>	360
VIII.	<i>Qāt</i> , Governance and Political Stability	365
A.	Bread and Circuses – <i>Qāt</i> as Strategic Commodity	365
B.	<i>Ḥaqq al-Qāt</i> – The Role of <i>Qāt</i> in Corruption	373
	Corruption and its Causes in Yemen	374
	<i>Qāt</i> 's Role in Corruption	375
C.	<i>Qāt</i> , the Yemeni War of Secession, and the Establishment of Northern Hegemony Over the South	380
	From Unity to Domination	381
	Transformations in the <i>Qāt</i> Trade to Cope With a Rising Southern Demand	388
	The Role of <i>Qāt</i> in Ḥaḍramawt and al-Mahra Since Unification With the North	408
	Resistance to <i>Qāt</i> Forms in the South	429
	Reasons for the Rise of <i>Qāt</i> Chewing in Ḥaḍramawt	436
	Restaging Secession	440
D.	Socotra, a Changing Island	445
	Rising <i>Qāt</i> Imports	447
	<i>Qāt</i> Marketing on Socotra	449
	Trends in <i>Qāt</i> Chewing on the Archipelago	452
	Growing Resistance to <i>Qāt</i>	454
	President Ṣāliḥ's ‘Polite’ Ban on <i>Qāt</i>	457
E.	Zaydī Insurgency – The Role of <i>Qāt</i> in Ṣa‘da Warfare	462
	The Rebels Target <i>Qāt</i> Markets During the First ‘Wars’	462
	Insurgents Gain Control Over Cross-Border Trade	464
	The Role of <i>Qāt</i> in Ṣa‘da's Agriculture	466
	Sabotaging the <i>Qāt</i> Sector to Weaken the Rebels	468
	<i>Qāt</i> to Boost Troop Morale	470
	The War Comes to Ṣan‘ā’	470
	<i>Al-Arḍ al-Maḥrūqa</i> – Politics of Scorched Earth	471
	Challenges to the Cross-Border Trade	476
	<i>Qāt</i> Taxes as Indicator of Government Control Over Ṣa‘da	476
	The Cost of the War to Yemen's Agricultural Sector	481
F.	<i>Qāt</i> 's Role in the Illicit Cross-Border Trade With Saudi Arabia	484
G.	Are There Links Between <i>Qāt</i> and Islamist Terrorism?	491
H.	<i>Qāt</i> as Motor of Decentralization and Popular Participation	498
	Local Governance Before the Reform	498
	The Administrative Organization After the Reform	499
	Impact of the Reform on Central Government	500
	The First Local Council Elections	502
	The New Local Administrations – Tasks and Challenges	502

Funding Sources of Local Administrations	503
Resource Availability at the Local Level	505
Budgetary Powers of Local Authorities	506
<i>Qāt</i> and its Role in the Budgets of Local Administrations	506
<i>Qāt</i> Revenue and its Role in Democratization	516
I. Civil Society and the <i>Qāt</i> Problem	520
National Association for Confronting the Harms of <i>Qāt</i>	523
The Aden Society for Struggling Against <i>Qāt</i>	527
Boy and Girl Scouts Battle Against <i>Qāt</i>	529
<i>Qāt</i> Hazards Control Society	530
The General Union of <i>Qāt</i> Sellers	534
Yemeni Cancer Society	536
Epilogue	536
J. The Ismā‘īlī ‘War’ to Eradicate <i>Qāt</i> in Ḥarāz	540
Substituting <i>Qāt</i> (First Phase 1999-2006)	542
Successes and Failures of the First Phase of Uprooting	551
Substituting <i>Qāt</i> (Second Phase - 2007 Onwards)	555
Outlook	560
K. National Symbolism in a Fragile State and the Dilemma of Defining Yemeni Identity	563
L. The Scent of Jasmine in the Land of <i>Qāt</i> or the Arab Revolution, Yemeni Style	571
Demonstrations End When the <i>Qāt</i> Markets Open	571
<i>Qāt</i> Payoffs to Reward Partisans	573
Cheap <i>Qāt</i> for De-Escalation in Southern Yemen	576
Chewing for a New Era	577
Tribesmen Take Control of Northern Ṣan‘ā’	581
The Fuel Shortage and its Impact on the Economy and on <i>Qāt</i> Consumption	583
Revolting Against <i>Qāt</i> and Other ‘Little Dictators’	585
<i>Notes for Chapter VIII</i>	590
IX. Conclusions and Outlook	619
A. Motivations Behind <i>Qāt</i> Politics and Anti- <i>Qāt</i> Activism	621
B. Yemen – Towards a Failing State?	626
C. Policy Options for the Rentier State Regarding <i>Qāt</i>	628
D. <i>Qāt</i> and the Donor Community	633
<i>Notes for Chapter IX</i>	635
X. Annex	637
Annex A – Color Plates (Maps & Photographs)	637
Annex B – Documents and Statistics	689
XI. Bibliography	781
XII. Index	807
XIII. Arabic Introduction	829
XIV. Arabic Table of Contents	836

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1:	Development of <i>Qāt</i> Area in the YAR, the PDRY and Since 1990 in Unified Yemen (in Comparison to Coffee and Grapes)	13
Table 2:	Percentage of Population Chewing per Gender and Governorate	17
Table 3:	Reasons for Starting Chewing for Males and Females	18
Table 4:	Reasons for Chewing <i>Qāt</i>	19
Table 5:	Reasons for not Chewing	19
Table 6:	Perceptions of <i>Qāt</i> Chewing. Responses to the Question “ <i>What do you consider negative about qāt chewing?</i> ”	20
Table 7:	Hectare-Size of Land Holdings with <i>Qāt</i>	28
Table 8:	Number of Households and Household Members Sustained by the <i>Qāt</i> Sector in 2003	31
Table 9:	Effects of <i>Qāt</i> Chewing on the Health of Consumers	34
Table 10:	Ways of Treating Unwanted Health Effects of <i>Qāt</i>	37
Table 11a:	Yemen - Selected Economic Indicators (1990-1999)	49
Table 11b:	Yemen - Selected Economic Indicators (2000-2009)	49
Table 12:	Yemen’s Main Export Commodities in 2008	50
Table 13:	<i>Qāt</i> Imports to Djibouti 1929-1972	66
Table 14:	Quantities of <i>Qāt</i> Imported into the Colony of Aden in the Years 1950/51 to 1956/57	83
Table 15:	<i>Qāt</i> Imports into Aden Colony Prior to the 1957 <i>Qāt</i> Ban	83
Table 16:	<i>Qāt</i> Quantities Imported into Laḥij Sultanate During 1956 and 1957	86
Table 17:	Price of Smuggled <i>Qāt</i> in Aden as Compared to Laḥij Prices (1958)	88
Table 18:	<i>Qāt</i> Chewing Prevalence Among the General Population and Among Students in Different Governorates of Jāzān Province	123
Table 19:	Ethiopia’s Exports During the Fiscal Year of 2008/2009	145
Table 20:	<i>Qāt</i> and Coffee in Agricultural Statistics of the PDRY	164
Table 21:	<i>Qāt</i> in the PDRY’s 1985 Agricultural Census	169
Table 22:	Yemen’s Trade Balance, 1969/70 – 1973/74	179
Table 23:	Prices of Weapons in the Jihāna Arms Market in 1999	202
Table 24:	<i>Qāt</i> Cultivation by Governorate and Irrigation Source as Reported by the YAR’s 1979 Agricultural Census	204
Table 25:	<i>Qāt</i> Cultivation by Governorate as Reported by the Agricultural Census of 1989	204
Table 26:	Yemen’s Household Budget Surveys - Average Spending on Basic Foodstuffs, Tobacco and <i>Qāt</i>	209
Table 27:	<i>Qāt</i> Cultivation in the Districts of Ṣan‘ā’ Governorate in 2003	212
Table 28:	Projections of the <i>Qāt</i> Committee for 1998 based on the 1979 and 1989 Agricultural Surveys in the YAR and the 1985 Agricultural Census in the PDRY	249
Table 29:	Volume of Official Development Assistance to Yemen in Comparison to Oil and Gas Revenue in the Period of 1992 to 2003	312
Table 30:	Trends in Nominal and Real Wages of Civil Servants	374
Table 31:	Average Retail Prices in Ṣan‘ā’ City for Locally Produced Commodities	375

Table 32:	Share of Habitual <i>Qāt</i> Chewers Among Yemeni Civil Servants and Monthly Spending on <i>Qāt</i> in 2001	377
Table 33:	Production of Beer in the Aden Brewery	386
Table 34:	Sales Shares of Different <i>Qāt</i> Cultivars in Aden Markets in August 2005	404
Table 35:	Provenance of <i>Qāt</i> Sellers in Selected Aden Markets (August 2005)	406
Table 36:	Seasonal Variability of <i>Qāt</i> Supply to Ḥaḍramawt	414
Table 37:	Projection for Seasonal Volume of <i>Qāt</i> Sales (2005)	414
Table 38:	Provenance of <i>Qāt</i> Sellers in Selected Markets of Ḥaḍramawt (June 2005)	416
Table 39:	Development of <i>Qāt</i> -Retailer Numbers in Selected Towns of Ḥaḍramawt (1991-2005)	418
Table 40:	Savings of <i>Qāt</i> Chewing and Non-Chewing Households in Different Governorates	429
Table 41:	Profit Calculation of a <i>Qāt</i> Merchant in Ḥadībū (Nov. 2001)	450
Table 42:	<i>Qāt</i> Shipments Arriving at Mūrī Airport on the Friday Plane (Number of Bunches, Share of Varieties) and Retail Price in Ḥadībū Including Weight	452
Table 43:	Weekly Chewing Frequencies Among Different Population Groups on Socotra in April 2005	453
Table 44:	<i>Qāt</i> Cultivation Per District in Ṣa‘da Governorate (Results of the 2003 Agricultural Census)	468
Table 45:	Development of <i>Qāt</i> Consumption Tax Revenue in Selected Governorates of Northern Yemen (2005-2010) and Share of Ṣa‘da <i>Qāt</i> Taxes in Total <i>Qāt</i> Revenue	479
Table 46:	<i>Qāt Zakāt</i> Revenue in Yemen’s Governorates During 2002-2005 and its Share in Total <i>Zakāt</i> Revenue	509
Table 47:	Composition of District Local and Joint Governorate Revenue for all Governorates during 2003 and 2004	513
Table 48:	Share of <i>Qāt</i> Proceeds in District Local and Joint Governorate Revenue per Governorate during 2003 and 2004 (excluding <i>Zakāt</i>)	513
Table 49:	Shaykhs by Governorate and Average Population per Shaykh	771

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1:	Growth of <i>Qāt</i> Area and Population Development in Yemen (North and South)	13
Figure 2:	<i>Qāt</i> Chewing Frequency of Yemeni Males and Females	18
Figure 3:	Perceptions of Chewing Among Male and Female <i>Qāt</i> Users	21
Figure 4:	Monthly Household Income in 2005 and Share of Household Expenditure on <i>Qāt</i> in Different Income Groups	21
Figure 5:	Rainfall Regime, Temperatures and Harvest Seasons in the Ṣan‘ā’ Basin	23
Figure 6:	Development of Crop Area and Economics of the al-Raṣīn Family of Bayt al-Qāḍī, Hamḍān	27
Figure 7:	Development of the Yemeni Oil Sector, 1986-2011	52
Figure 8:	Frequency of <i>Qāt</i> Use in Jāzān Province (in Percent of Users) (“How many times did you chew <i>Qāt</i> during last 30 days?”)	124
Figure 9:	<i>Qāt</i> Consumption Tax Revenue Levied During 2004 at al-Azraqayn Checkpoint on the ‘Amrān Road	220
Figure 10:	Particularities in <i>Qāt</i> Consumption Tax Revenue Levied at Checkpoints Around the Capital Ṣan‘ā’	220
Figure 11:	Area of Different Crops in Yemen in the Years 1978/79 and 1989	221
Figure 12:	Value of Selected Agricultural Crops at Current Prices in 2003)	251
Figure 13:	Indicators of Economic Development and Security in Yemen (1990-2005) and the 1998/99 Revenue Crisis	288
Figure 14:	Number of Yemen Observer Front Page Articles Mentioning <i>Qāt</i> , Weapons and Corruption	329
Figure 15:	Development of <i>Qāt</i> Consumption Tax Revenue in Aden and Ṣan‘ā’ Capital Secretariat (1990 to 2010)	407
Figure 16:	Profit Calculation for Radā‘ī <i>Qāt</i> Sold in Ḥaḍramawt Markets	412
Figure 17:	Seasonality of <i>Qāt</i> Deliveries to Ḥaḍramawt (Average Monthly <i>Qāt</i> Consumption Tax Revenues 2001-2005)	415
Figure 18:	Development of <i>Qāt</i> Consumption Tax Revenue in Ḥaḍramawt (1990 to 2010)	424
Figure 19:	Development of <i>Qāt</i> Consumption Tax Revenue in Ṣa‘da Governorate as Indicator of Government Control During the Ḥawthī Insurgency and Comparison with <i>Qāt</i> Consumption Tax Revenue Development at National Level	477
Figure 20:	Receipt for the Collection of the Religious <i>Zakāt</i> Duty on <i>Qāt</i> Farming	508
Figure 21:	<i>Qāt Zakāt</i> Revenue 1990-2005	508
Figure 22:	<i>Qāt</i> Revenue in the Budgets of Governorate and District Local Authorities in 2004/2005	510
Figure 23:	Development of <i>Qāt</i> Consumption Tax Revenues from 1980 to 2010	512
Figure 24:	Contribution of <i>Qāt</i> to the Youth and Sports Tax (2002-2010)	515
Figure 25:	Number of <i>Qāt</i> Trees in Different Governorates and Shares of Central Transfers in the Budgets of Local Administrations	516
Figure 26:	World Market Prices for Coffee (1980 - 2011)	558
Figure 27:	Agricultural Exports Earnings from Eastern Ethiopia, 1987-2004	631
Figure 28:	Value of Agricultural Crops at Current Prices in 2003 and 2009	774
Figure 29:	Average Monthly per Capita Expenditures on <i>Qāt</i> , Education and Health in 1992	776

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1:	Vernacular Names of <i>Qāt</i> in Eastern Africa and the Middle East	6
Map 2:	Areas of <i>Qāt</i> Cultivation and Consumption in Eastern Africa and the Middle East	7
Map 3:	Historical Expansion of <i>Qāt</i> Cultivation in Yemen	10
Map 4:	Development of Yemen's Asphalted Transport Network Connecting Major Market Towns	12
Map 5:	<i>Qāt</i> Markets of Ṣan'ā' in the 1940s	110
Map 6:	<i>Qāt</i> Chewing Regime of the PDRY (1977-1989)	167
Map 7:	<i>Qāt</i> Taxation, Tax Evasion and Clientelism in the Ṣan'ā' Region	216
Map 8:	Monthly <i>Qāt</i> Tax Revenue in 2004 at Different Tax Stations Around Ṣan'ā'	217
Map 9:	Average Monthly per Capita Expenditure on <i>Qāt</i> in Yemen (1992)	233
Map 10:	Sūq al-Jumruk, <i>Qāt</i> Wholesale Market in al-Ḍālī' (2006)	391
Map 11:	<i>Qāt</i> Markets and <i>Qāt</i> Taxation in Aden Governorate (2005)	396
Map 12:	Origin and Share of <i>Qāt</i> Cultivars Sold in the Markets of Aden (August 2005)	403
Map 13:	East Africa's and Arabia's <i>Qāt</i> and Conflict Zone	627
Map 14:	Extension of <i>Qāt</i> Cultivation in Yemen's Highlands	640
Map 15:	Borders, Administrative Divisions, and Population Distribution in Yemen	641
Map 16:	Share of <i>Qāt</i> in the Cultivated Area of Yemen	642
Map 17:	Regional Differences in the Average Size of Landholdings with <i>Qāt</i>	643
Map 18:	<i>Qāt</i> Consumption Tax Revenue by Governorate in 2005	644
Map 19:	<i>Zakāt</i> Revenue from <i>Qāt</i> Production by Governorate in 2005	645
Map 20:	Regional Arms Holdings Among Yemeni Tribesmen	646
Map 21:	<i>Qāt</i> Cultivation and Distribution of Religious Doctrines	647
Map 22:	<i>Qāt</i> Trade Routes and <i>Qāt</i> Taxation in Yemen's Arid East	648
Map 23:	<i>Qāt</i> Markets and Merchant Numbers in Yemen's East (2005)	649
Map 24:	Landholders Cultivating <i>Qāt</i> in Yemen	650
Map 25:	Share of <i>Qāt</i> in Yemen's Cultivated Area	651
Map 26:	Rural Poverty Levels and <i>Qāt</i> Cultivation in Ḥajja Governorate	652
Map 27:	Proposed Zones for Regulating <i>Qāt</i> Consumption (1999)	773

LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex B – Documents and Statistics

Annex 1:	Cabinet Order No. 43 for the Year 1999 on <i>Qāt</i>	690
Annex 2:	<i>Qāt</i> Policy Directives in the Second Five Year Plan (2001-2005)	692
Annex 3:	Cabinet Decree No. 66 for the Year 2002 Concerning the Approval on Holding a National Conference on <i>Qāt</i>	696
Annex 4:	Letter of President ‘Alī ‘Abd Allāh Šāliḥ to the Participants of the First National Conference on <i>Qāt</i>	698
Annex 5:	Letter of Appreciation of the Participants of the First National Conference on <i>Qāt</i> to President ‘Alī ‘Abd Allāh Šāliḥ	700
Annex 6:	Opening Address of Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Qādir BāJamāl Held at the First National Conference on <i>Qāt</i>	702
Annex 7:	Opening Address of the Minister of Planning & Development, Aḥmad Muḥammad Šūfān, Held at the First National Conference on <i>Qāt</i>	706
Annex 8:	Recommendations of the First National Conference on <i>Qāt</i>	712
Annex 9:	Cabinet Decree No. 134 for the Year 2002 Concerning the Recommendations of the National Conference on <i>Qāt</i>	716
Annex 10:	Cabinet Decree No. 135 for the Year 2002 Concerning the [Institutional] Affiliation of Public Parks and the Supervision of their Management	718
Annex 11:	Cabinet Decree No. 136 for the Year 2002 on Dealing with Smuggled Chemicals on their Incineration, and on Dealing with those Imported Legally	720
Annex 12:	Cabinet Decree No. 137 for the Year 2002 on the Prohibition of <i>Qāt</i> Consumption in Government Buildings and Educational Institutions	722
Annex 13:	Cabinet Decree No. 138 for the Year 2002 Concerning Media Awareness Campaigns on the Effects of <i>Qāt</i>	724
Annex 14:	Cabinet Decree No. 139 for the Year 2002 Concerning the Use, and Handling of Chemical Pesticides Employed in Agriculture	726
Annex 15:	Cabinet Decree No. 140 for the Year 2002 on Educational Awareness on the Effects of <i>Qāt</i>	728
Annex 16:	Ministerial Decree No. 78 for the Year 1995 Concerning the Establishment of a Unit for Research on <i>Qāt</i> within the Agricultural Research and Extension Authority	730
Annex 17:	Ministerial Decree No. 67 for the Year 1997 Concerning Appointment of a Chairman to the <i>Qāt</i> Research Unit within the Agricultural Research and Extension Authority	732
Annex 18:	Law No. 38 for the Year 1976 Regarding Prohibition of the Consumption, Sale, and Purchase of <i>Qāt</i> During Certain Days of the Week in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen	734
Annex 19:	Prime Ministry Decree No. 72 for the Year 2007 Concerning Prohibition of <i>Qāt</i> Cultivation on Agricultural Flatlands	736
Annex 20:	Prime Ministry Decree No. 35 for the Year 2008 for the Preparation of a Draft Decree to Constrict Land Used for <i>Qāt</i> Cultivation	738
Annex 21:	Banning <i>Qāt</i> Import to Socotra (Local Council)	740

Annex 22:	Banning <i>Qāt</i> Import to Socotra (Yemenia Airways Instructions)	742
Annex 23:	Banning <i>Qāt</i> Import to Socotra (Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority Instructions)	744
Annex 24:	Banning <i>Qāt</i> Import to Socotra (Letter from the Office of the President to the Governor of Ḥaḍramawt)	746
Annex 25:	Contract for the Uprooting of <i>Qāt</i> Trees of the Ismā‘īlī Buhra Community in Ḥarāz	748
Annex 26:	Statistics of the Buhra <i>Qāt</i> -Uprooting Initiative in Eastern Ḥarāz	750
Annex 27:	Poem by the Jurisprudent, Poet and Mystic ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Imām Sharaf al-Dīn	751
Annex 28:	<i>Qāt</i> Poem by the Lebanese Writer Qusṭanṭīn Yannī	752
Annex 29:	<i>Qāt</i> Poem by Imām Yaḥyā ibn Ḥamid al-Dīn, King of Yemen	753
Annex 30:	A 1972 Poem Praising Prime Minister Muḥsin al-‘Aynī for his Anti- <i>Qāt</i> Politics by Fāṭima Ṣāliḥ al-Shahārī	754
Annex 31:	A Poem on <i>Qāt</i> Written by Sa‘īd ‘Ayza al-‘Āmrī, a Tribal Poet of Quf al-Awāmīr, the Desert Plateau North of the Wādī Ḥaḍramawt	756
Annex 32:	The Damned Tree – A Poem by Nā‘if al-Milayk	757
Annex 33:	ID Card Designed by the General Union of <i>Qāt</i> Sellers for <i>Qāt</i> Farmers	758
Annex 34:	<i>Qāt</i> Seller Permit Issued by the Ṣan‘ā’ Municipality	760
Annex 35a	Gazetteer of <i>Qāt</i> Markets and Retailers in Aden Governorate	762
Annex 35b:	Legend - Gazetteer of Aden <i>Qāt</i> Markets	763
Annex 36:	<i>Qāt</i> Markets, Retailers and Daily <i>Qāt</i> Sales in Ḥaḍramawt Governorate	764
Annex 37	<i>Qāt</i> Markets, Retailers and Daily <i>Qāt</i> Sales in al-Mahra and Shabwa Governorates	765
Annex 38:	The Most Common <i>Qāt</i> Varieties in Ḥaḍramawt’s Markets	766
Annex 39:	<i>Qāt</i> Bales and Bunches in Ḥaḍramawt in June 2005	767
Annex 40:	Profit Calculation for <i>Radā‘ī Qāt</i> Sold in Ḥaḍramawt	768
Annex 41:	Letter of the Sabā’ Yemen Insurance Company Regarding the Coverage of Accidents Under the Influence of <i>Qāt</i>	769
Annex 42:	Shaykhs in Yemen, their Changing Role and their Entitlements	770
Annex 43:	<i>Qāt</i> in the Ministry of Water & Environment’s <i>National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program, 2005-2009</i> (NWSSIP)	772
Annex 44:	A Donor Proposal for <i>Qāt</i> Consumption Control (1999)	773
Annex 45	Value of Agricultural Crops at Current Prices in 2003 and 2009	774
Annex 46:	Value of Agricultural Crops at Current Prices During the Period 1996-2003	775
Annex 47:	Average Monthly Per Capita Expenditures on <i>Qāt</i> , Education and Health in 1992	776
Annex 48:	Average Monthly Household Expenditure on Selected Items in 1992	776
Annex 49:	Employment Categories in the Yemeni Civil Service and Salaries Grades	777
Annex 50:	<i>Qāt</i> in the Yemen’s National Accounts	778
Annex 51:	Road Map Towards Solving Water, <i>Qāt</i> , and Insecticides Problems in Yemen (2008)	779

PROLOGUE

Qāt (*Catha edulis* Forsk.) is a psychoactive stimulant that is grown in many of the highland areas of Eastern Africa, ranging from the southern Sudan through Ethiopia and Kenya to Madagascar and the Transvaal. It is also grown across the Red Sea in Yemen's western highlands and in the 'Asīr and Jāzān mountains of Saudi Arabia.¹ While being considered a drug in most Arab states, as well as in many western countries, there is no viable legislation in Yemen today effectively controlling its cultivation, consumption or trade.²

The hardy tree that is famed by farmers for its drought resistance, is grown according to official statistics on 12% of Yemen's agricultural land, covering 153,500 hectares in 2009.³ A number of leading Yemeni researchers however believe that the actual figure may be double.⁴ In some of Yemen's highland districts over 90% of farmers are involved in *qāt* agriculture, growing the drug on over 80% of the cultivated land.⁵ According to Yemen's 2003 agricultural census 494,000 landholders grow *qāt* in the mountain areas. This is 43.6% of the country's farmers and represents 3.9 million persons, considering average Yemeni farming family size of just below eight.⁶ *Qāt* accounts for 6% of the country's GDP and for as much as one third of the agricultural GDP.⁷ It accounts for an average of 10% of the expenditures of Yemeni families, but *qāt*-related spending may reach nearly 40% in poor households.⁸ The *qāt* sector provides employment for one in every seven working Yemenis. In the capital Ṣan'a' alone, some 13,000 persons are involved in the sale of the drug⁹. On average 72% of Yemeni men and 33% of women above the age of 12 chew the bitter leaves of the *qāt* plant. Some 42% of male consumers chew five to seven days per week and display compulsive habits.¹⁰

As the predominant cash crop and mainstay of the country's rural economy, the income *qāt* generates prevents people in many of Yemen's highland areas from drifting into the cities in order to seek work. The distribution network for *qāt* is undoubtedly the most advanced in the nation and few other economic sectors feature such a high level of organization. But *qāt* also depletes scarce water resources, contributes to soil degradation, and has crowded out production of essential food crops and agricultural exports. The area under *qāt* has expanded nearly 20-fold over the last four decades, displacing exportable coffee, fruits and vegetables, sorghum and wheat. Exports of cash crops such as coffee have been regressive while food imports have exploded due to the inroads made by *qāt* in the rural economy.¹¹

Qāt consumption and *qāt*-related expenditure also contribute to corruption, poverty, malnutrition and the disintegration of families. For its producers and consumers alike, *qāt* is seen as one of the main health hazards in Yemen, mainly due to the unregulated use of pesticides in its cultivation. Given the economic importance of *qāt*, it is not surprising that taxes stemming from the production and sale of the plant are substantial and constitute the main source of local revenue for many governorate and district administrations. The *qāt* sector contributes to government revenue in four ways, by a religious tithe levied on *qāt* production (*zakāt*), a public cleaning tax for keeping *qāt* markets tidy, and finally by a *qāt* consumption tax and a youth & sports tax, both levied on *qāt* sales. While *zakāt* is imposed as a direct tax and collected at farm level by *zakāt* assessors, the other taxes are levied as indirect taxes at military checkpoints on the roads leading into the cities and in *qāt* markets. The *qāt* consumption tax alone amounted to 3.4 billion Yemeni riyāls in 2010 (US\$ 16 million). *Qāt* is also smuggled across the mountains into Saudi Arabia where its consumption and trade are banned. This business is believed to award Yemen revenues of at least US\$ 1 billion every year. The government has however no control over this illicit trade and it is believed that its proceeds help to finance the Ḥawthī insurgency in Yemen's northern Ṣa'da province.

Colonial government's in Aden and East Africa have issued repeated bans on *qāt*, to little avail. Also, the modernist revolutionary governments of North and South Yemen have since the late 1960s initiated a number of anti-*qāt* campaigns and even threatened to uproot the trees. With President 'Alī 'Abd Allāh Ṣāliḥ's ascent to power in 1978 the *qāt* issue became a taboo and the crop disappeared

from national statistics. At the same time, *qāt* production by highland tribes was promoted by countless exemptions and subsidies that triggered an unprecedented mining of groundwater resources. A diesel subsidy made *qāt* cultivation a highly profitable venture even in the desert-like eastern plateau and escarpment areas of Ṣan‘ā’, al-Jawf and Mārib governorates. Here limited rainfall had so far set narrow boundaries to agriculture. It seems that the toleration and promotion of the drug was part of a power bargain between the Ṣāliḥ regime and the restive tribes that, after the political turmoil of the late 1970s, has imparted highland Yemen several decades of relative stability. It would be nearly 20 years until renewed efforts against the spread of the drug were made and before *qāt* reappeared in Yemen’s statistical yearbooks upon pressure of the country’s international creditors.

The 1990 unification with socialist South Yemen, where strict *qāt* regulations had been in place, did not impact the northern stance of *qāt*. Southern laws were repealed and the northern mantle of secrecy regarding *qāt* extended over the whole country. In the wake of the 1994 war of secession, tens of thousands of northern troops were stationed in every part of the former south. As most of these soldiers were confirmed *qāt* chewers, the distribution networks for the drug have been extended even to remote desert watch posts and Bedouin settlements on the Saudi and Omani borders. Growing consumption of *qāt* among the southern population has led over the past two decades to ever increasing financial transfers from this economically marginalized part of the country to the northern highlands.

Today, *qāt* chewing is an integral part of life all across Yemen and a generally accepted habit in all strata of society. Even afternoon sessions in ministries or in the country’s consultative assembly are held in a setting of chewing. Also, Yemen’s political and economic elite has during the past decades developed a vested interest in *qāt*. Many have invested in the *qāt* sector since the returns generated by *qāt* cultivation and trade are simply staggering. The highland tribes in whose territories the bulk of *qāt* is produced have greatly profited from the *laissez faire* approach of the government. Profits from the *qāt* sector have enabled them to maintain their autonomy *vis-à-vis* the state and build up true tribal armies equipped even with heavy weaponry. Any reduction in *qāt* production, let alone a ban of the crop or of its consumption would thus not only adversely affect the rural highland population, but is bound to arouse the resistance of the tribes and further destabilize the country making it perfectly ungovernable.

Factors constraining change in Yemen regarding *qāt* are foremost the government’s fear of the tribes and of public unrest as well as the involvement of many members of the ruling class in *qāt* farming. Paired with the inability of authorities to enforce legislation in the cities – not to mention the tribal areas – this makes policymakers reluctant to speak out openly against *qāt*. This is exacerbated by a flagrant lack of alternative pastimes, the absence of other viable and profitable economic activities, and by the lack of markets for alternative high-value crops.

The second part of the 1980s saw the beginning of a transformation of the two Yemeni states from semi-rentiers heavily dependent on migrant remittances and unstable political rents into a politically unified oil rentier. Since then politics in Yemen have become tightly entangled with the windfalls from the oil sector and world market prices for oil. The revenues from the petroleum sector account for over 90% of Yemen’s export earnings and for around 70% of government revenue. They have enabled the regime in the second part of the 1990s and early 2000s to considerably enlarge its network of patronage and extend its power over many areas of the countryside. During this period *qāt* politics has become more and more entangled with the revenue situation of the regime and has been employed increasingly as a means of rent-seeking during times of crisis. Despite the staunch resistance of *qāt* farmers and tribes, the government has since 1999 repeatedly embarked on anti-*qāt* campaigns with high audience appeal. These campaigns were often rather spontaneous and ill coordinated. Most of them were thus short-lived and laws enacted concerning *qāt* were never really enforced (e.g. the 2002 law proscribing chewing in government facilities). These campaigns have effectuated no change in terms of cultivation and consumption of the drug, but have succeeded in earning Yemen’s policy makers the respect of their Arab counterparts and the benevolence of the donor community. Without compromising its grip on power, the regime has become the recipient of

increasing levels of development aid. *Qāt* policy has handsomely paid off, not the least in the promise of admitting Yemen to the Gulf Cooperation Council by 2016.

Qāt also played an important role during Yemen's 'Youth Revolution' of 2011. Often believed to be a drug engendering complacency, lethargy and inaction, *qāt* has helped to mobilize both the regime's supporters and anti-*Ṣāliḥ* protesters: Supporters of the regime erected their tents on Taḥrīr Square and attempted to sit out the protests while chewing *qāt* freely handed out by the regime. In 'Change Square' where the revolution was masterminded and where protesters had erected their tent city, a new visionary order for a post-*Ṣāliḥ* era was vividly discussed and elaborated while chewing *qāt*.

As Yemen heads towards the post oil era – with some analysts predicting a depletion of oil reserves as early as 2017 – it will be interesting to observe what role *qāt* and *qāt* revenue will play in this future polity. Will the regime be able to capitalize on the *qāt* sector? Will it succeed in tightening its grip on *qāt* markets and in streamlining *qāt* taxation to make up for lost revenue from oil? Or will the disintegrating network of patronage make the country perfectly ungovernable with *qāt* producing tribes gaining yet more autonomy and *qāt* becoming the true ruler of this society as it is in much of Somalia today?

Is *Qāt* a Drug?

In Yemen *qāt* is not considered as a drug by authorities and even car insurance policies explicitly cover accidents caused while chewing *qāt* while driving (see annex 41). *Qāt* may or may not be a drug in the clinical sense, thus a drug causing physical addiction. The leaves of the *qāt* tree are certainly a social drug. Social life in most parts of Yemen circulates around *qāt* today and many Yemenis believe there would not be any social life at all, were there not *qāt*. Chewing the leaves creates delight, relaxes, and stimulates mutual understanding and companionship. It helps to create strong bonds between people and facilitates the mediation of Yemen's many tribal troubles. Not a mere few believe they cannot get up, let alone work, without *qāt* and thus start their day with chewing. *Qāt* gives them strength of the body and strength of will. Chewing *qāt* makes one forget despair and violence – be it just for a few hours – it makes one cope with the grievances of life and it gives hope in a country whose political and economic future looks so bleak. It makes one forget poverty and the hungry mouths to feed at home.

Yet many Yemenis – educated or not – would like to abstain from the use of the leaves from time to time, be it for financial, family or health reasons. But they feel compelled to chew by friends, neighbors or colleagues and fear exclusion from social circles and social life. Many fear the loss of respect, the loss of business opportunities, or simply the exclusion from information circulating in *qāt* chews. Over the years, I have observed how the chewing habit has proliferated in the Ḥaḍramawt and on the island of Socotra (areas that I first visited in 1993); how it took hold of the coastal population and then slowly crept up the *wādīs* to the herders of the highlands, how it spread from soldiers to fishermen, from traders to farmers, from adults to adolescents, and finally from husbands to wives. I watched a defenseless and desperate population – local councillors, shaykhs, fathers and spouses – fighting its spread with all means at hand. Without success. I watched how *qāt* ravaged these regions' unique culture and how it changed social customs and society, how traditional leisure pursuits disappeared and how values and ethics have become diluted.

I have known Yemen for almost twenty years, took part in innumerable *qāt* chews and interviewed several thousands of people on the *qāt* issue. For me, the leaves of the *qāt* tree are not a narcotic drug. However, I hold the firm belief that they are much more than the "*mild social stimulant*" to which literature so often refers. They are potent social drug, holding Yemen and Yemeni life firmly in its grip. They create a mental form of addiction that makes the plant as ravaging and certainly as dangerous as any narcotic drug.

Approach of the Study¹²

The literature on the habit of *qāt* chewing, its social role and the impact of *qāt* use on health is quite impressive. This book does not attempt to duplicate this and is focussing on the role of *qāt* in the politics of modern Yemen and of the wider region – a topic that has so far been entirely ignored. The review of *qāt* policies and economic events during the past decades will show how successive Yemeni governments have apprehended and used *qāt* increasingly as an instrument of politics. It will show that government action regarding the drug is less driven by a genuine desire for reform or by the interest of ridding Yemeni society of a social evil, but much rather by the need for mobilizing financial resources and by a desire for societal control and political stability. *Qāt* politics – the study suggests – has above all become part of a comprehensive strategy of rent-seeking, employed by the ruling elite in times of revenue crisis in order to uphold the state's monopoly of power and maintain its widespread network of patronage. *Qāt* politics is since the late 1970s part of a ruling bargain between the regime and the tribes, explaining the tolerant and often supportive stance of government towards the drug.

After a brief overview of the history and development of *qāt* consumption in Yemen as well as on the extent of the habit and its detrimental effects on health, both in chapter I, in chapter II the metamorphosis of Yemen during the 1970s from an agrarian into a semi-rentier state is documented, as well as its transformation from a country depending largely on worker remittances and political rents into an oil economy. The book then analyzes *qāt* politics in a regional retrospect (chapter III). This includes the struggle of colonial administrations against *qāt* in Yemen and Eastern Africa, the role of *qāt* during the reign of Yemen's last Imāms and the position of the League of Arab States *vis-à-vis* the drug. Here also the fruitless efforts of the Saudi Arabian government and of Saudi religious scholars against the crop are presented and an analysis of *qāt* politics in post-colonial Somalia given, where the drug has become one of the factors fueling the prolonged civil war. In chapter IV, the approach to *qāt* of Yemen's revolutionary governments in both South and North Yemen is described, whereupon in chapter V changes in *qāt* politics and the in development of *qāt* farming during the first two decades of the Ṣāliḥ regime are given a closer look. Chapter VI documents in great detail, how *qāt* has become an instrument of rent-seeking in times of financial and political crisis.

In chapter VII, the ups and downs of *qāt* politics following Yemen's First National Conference on *Qāt* are described and the *qāt* activism of the country's ruling class documented following the Gulf Cooperation Council's expression of intent to admit Yemen to the organization if it combats corruption, weapons and *qāt*. Here also interviews with a number of high-ranking Yemeni policy makers on the subject of *qāt* are echoed.

In chapter VIII, the role *qāt* plays for political stability, political control and for identity in a fragile state is analyzed. This chapter also reviews the role of *qāt* in the Ṣa'da war and in terrorism, in spreading northern hegemony over former South Yemen, and it discusses the role of *qāt* in Yemen's 2011 'Youth Revolution'. Further, the effects of *qāt* on corruption and the importance of *qāt* revenue for Yemen's decentralization process are examined. Also, the difficult task of civil society organizations and of religious communities fighting *qāt* is documented.

Finally, in chapter IX, conclusions are presented and an outlook for a Yemen after the conclusion of the oil era is given.

Peer Gatter, Frankfurt am Main, June 2012

www.qat-yemen.com